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Abstract — Recently, digital streams have become widely used
to make audio, video, and other media available in real-time
over the Internet. As with other transmission methods, the
recipient needs to have a possibility to verify the source and
authenticity of the received information. Several techniques
have been proposed to deal with this issue. Most of them
are vulnerable to packet losses or they introduce unacceptable
computational and/or communication overheads. Some of the
graph-based techniques provide immunity to burst losses of
certain length. However, these techniques are not immune to
the loss of packets containing signatures or occasional burst
of lengths greater than the assumed one. In the paper, we
propose a modification to one of the graph-based techniques
that introduces immunity to the loss of packets containing sig-
natures, without introducing any additional overheads.
Keywords — authentication algorithms, hash chains, signing
digital streams, Markov modelling, Gilbert-Elliot channel.
1. Introduction
Streamed data or a stream of data packets is generated by
a specialized application on a server machine, and then
send in a form of autonomous packets over the Internet (or
other packet switched network). The process of splitting
a large block of information into the autonomous packets
by a server application needs to be distinguished from nor-
mal splitting of a large file into packets before sending them
through the packet switched network. In the later case, a file
to be transmitted is divided into packets by a transport pro-
tocol (e.g. TCP [1]). The packets are then transmitted to
the receiving host. Because they are numbered, they can
be reassembled at the receiver in the desired order, and in
case of packets missing or erroneous ones, they can be re-
transmitted. Only after correctly reassembling the packets
(some integrity is checked through the error control cod-
ing), the full file is passed by the transport protocol to the
application layer of the receiving host. The application can
then execute this file (or perform other operation). This is
illustrated in Fig. 1 where it is shown that for the applica-
tion layers in normal data transmission over the Internet, the
transmitted file is one contiguous block, not much different
from a file read from disk.
In case of streaming, a file is divided into packets at the
application layer. These packets are of the size, which
would fit into the size of a packet in the underlying packet
network. In the case of the Internet, it is usually not more
than 1000–1500 bytes [2]. Every packet of a stream is than
treated like a full file by the transport layer, and transmit-
ted to the receiving host independently. As soon as such
a packet arrives at the transport layer of the receiving host
it is passed to the application layer, as there is no need to
reassemble anything. For the transport protocol, this packet
Fig. 1. Transmission of non-streamed data during a file transfer.
constitutes the whole file. The client application can than
execute or play the received packet as it comes. It is the
application task, to discard packets coming out of order.
This is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Transmission of streamed data during a real player ses-
sion.
As the streaming involves mainly real time applications [3]
(e.g. real player) the UDP [1] transport is usually used,
which means that there are no retransmissions or integrity
checks at the transport layer. This must be catered for by
the application. The advantage of UDP over TCP is its
speed and lower communication overhead but there is no
guarantee for packet delivery or for its correctness.
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Another feature of streams, which distinguish them from
normal messages, is that the receiver utilizes data and re-
ceives at more or less the input rate. Hence, it cannot buffer
large amount of unused data [4].
The importance of the need to authenticate streamed data
manifests itself in a fact that a recipient would like to
have a possibility to verify the source and authenticity of
the received information. For example, another feature of
streams, which distinguish them from normal messages is
important to the listeners of an Internet radio station that
the audio stream they receive was really broadcasted by the
station they listen to. On the other hand, it is equally im-
portant to that station that only the content it broadcasts
is attributed to it. Malicious parties should be prevented
from injecting commercials or offensive material into
the stream.
Moreover, those guarantees must be non-repudiable, which
means that a positive verification has to be enough to hold
the transmitter responsible for the contents. An answer to
those problems is the use of digital signatures. However,
the digital signature technology has been developed for sin-
gle messages, not for a continuous stream of autonomous
packets [5–7].
Authentication of a single message or a file transferred from
a server to a remote client can be done using one of the
standard schemes, like digital signature. The signature or
other authentication features are generated by the applica-
tion and appended in some form to the file. The file is then
passed to the transport layer, where it is packetized. The
part that contains the signature is not treated in anyway
different to the other contents of the message (file). At the
remote client machine, the transport layer reassembles the
received packets, checks the message (file) integrity and
passes the whole message (file) to the application layer,
where verification of the message (file) is performed.
For the streamed data, this approach is not possible to use.
First of all, the application layer at the server generates au-
tonomous packets itself, and the transport layer considers
those packets as separate messages. At the remote client
the packets are used as they arrive. This means that they are
not assembled back at the application layer. In the optimal
solution, they are even not buffered. Hence, it is not pos-
sible to have the approach used to authenticate and verify
messages (file) used for non-streamed data directly applied
to the streamed data. The nature of a digital stream forces
the need to authenticate and verify each of the received
packets. As a result, each packet must carry some features
verifiable by a remote client.
Several different authentication/verification schemes have
been proposed in literature, e.g. [5–7, 9, 10, 14]. Most of
them can be classified into two major groups:
 The schemes where every packet carries the full in-
formation necessary to verify the packet [6, 7], which
in some sense resembles signing of every packet in-
dividually.
 The schemes where only one packet in the stream
(usually the first or last) is signed and the other pack-
ets are connected with the signature by a chain of
hashes [5, 9, 14].
There are, of course, several modifications to the second
group, e.g. [14]. However, all of them suffer from the fact
that once the verification chain is broken, there is no means
to verify packets incoming after the break. The way to
avoid this drawback, and somehow combine the benefits of
both groups has been proposed by Golle and Modadugu
in [10].
They proposed to divide the stream into sequences of N
packets, with each of the sequence being individually veri-
fiable. Hence, a break in the verification chain would result
in rejection of a maximum of one sequence of packets but
not all packets coming after the break. The technique pro-
posed in [10] is resistant to bursty losses with bursts of
up to a predefined length. However, even an isolated sin-
gle packet loss, when the packet containing a signature is
involved, results in a loss of the whole sequence of pack-
ets. In this paper, we propose a simple but efficient way to
mitigate this problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly
introduce some of the techniques proposed to authenti-
cate digital streams, concentrating on the method proposed
in [10]. Section 3 describes the Gilbert-Elliott channel
model [15, 16] and shows the level of vulnerability of Golle
and Modadugu method to the loss of signed packets. In
Section 4, we introduce our modification and calculate the
probability that the modified authentication chain can be
broken for a given bursty channel, while Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Some of the proposed schemes
to authenticate digital streams
2.1. Block signatures
Signing every packet of the data stream can be considered
as a direct extension of the message signing technique into
authentication of digital streams. This approach, however,
involves unacceptable overheads, both a computational and
a communication one. Some reduction in those overheads
without compromising the benefits of having every packet
independently verifiable has been proposed in [6].
One of the stream signing techniques proposed by Wong
and Lam in [6] is a star chaining technique. During the
authentication phase, a block of “m” packets is formed and
hash functions are calculated for every packet in a block,
and then for a sequence of these individual hashes a block
hash is calculated. After that, the block hash is signed us-
ing a standard digital signature algorithm. For packets to be
individually verifiable, each packet needs the full authenti-
cation information, called a packet signature. The packet
signature consists of the block signature, the packet num-
ber in the block, and the hashes of all other packets in the
block. The authentication process and the transmission of
the resulting packet block are illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Authentication process in star chaining scheme [13], and transmission of the resulting packet block.
Fig. 4. Tree chain authentication process [13], and transmission of the resulting packet block.
The verification procedure is as follows:
 For the first packet received from the block, the ver-
ifier calculates the packet’s hash.
 Based on the calculated packet hash, the packet num-
ber, and the hashes of other packets in the block con-
tained in the packet signature, the verifier computes
the block hash.
 Using the calculated block hash, receiver verifies the
block signature, if it is correct, the packet is accepted,
if not it is rejected.
For all other packets from the block, the verifier needs only
to calculate the new packet hash and compare it to the hash
contained in the packet from this block previously positively
verified. If they agree, the new packet is verified.
Another scheme proposed by Wong and Lam in [6], is
a generalization of their star chaining technique. In this
generalized scheme, the block hash is computed as a root
node of an authentication tree (see Fig. 4). In such a tree,
the packets’ hashes are the leaf nodes of the second-degree
authentication tree, with other nodes of the tree computed
as hashes of their children. For example, in Fig. 4, the
parent of leaves D
3
and D
4
is D
3 4
= h(D
3
; D
4
). The
block signature is calculated on the block hash.
In tree chaining, a packet signature (packet overhead) con-
sists of:
 The block signature.
 The packet number in a block.
 Siblings of each node in the packet’s path to the root.
From Fig. 4, it is visible that the communication over-
head can be reduced compared to the star chaining scheme.
However, this is paid by the increase in computational over-
head.
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During the verification process the packet’s path to the root
is verified, i.e. all nodes on that path. The procedure is
similar to that for the star-chaining scheme.
The main advantage of the both schemes is the ability to
independently verify each of the received packets, so there
is no problems with packets lost or tampered with that can
be discarded independently. On the other hand, they both
involve high computational overhead and quite high com-
munication overhead [10].
2.2. Hash chains
The simplest scheme using a hash chain was proposed by
Gennaro and Rohatgi in [5]. It involved the use of just one
full digital signature for the whole stream and hashes for
each block of “c” packets. The receiver required a buffer
of size “c”. The receiver first received the signature of the
20-byte hash of the first block and the hash itself. After
verifying the signature, the first hash should be verified. He
then started receiving the first block and calculated the hash
for this block. If it matched the verified hash, it could then
play the block. Otherwise the whole stream was rejected.
The first block carried the hash for the second block, and
so on. At the sender, the whole stream had to be known in
advance, as the hash for the block “i + 1” was appended
to the block “i”. Reducing the block size “c” to a single
packet meant no need for a buffer at the receiver side.
The main advantages of the scheme were very low com-
putational and communicational overheads. However, the
scheme was very vulnerable to packet losses, and even
a single packet loss would result in a break in the verifi-
cation chain and rejection of all successive packets. More-
over, the scheme was suited for the off-line applications
only. Some modification to the scheme was also proposed
in [5] for on-line applications. Unfortunately, it involved
significant complication of the scheme while maintaining
its vulnerability to packet losses.
Miner and Staddon in [14] propose to introduce additional
connections in the authentication chain in order to achieve
immunity against lost packets. As the result, the verification
chain can tolerate even burst losses of up to the predefined
number of packets. However, once the chain is broken due
to the longer than assumed burst, the verification cannot be
continued. Another disadvantage of the scheme is the fact
that it is suited for the off-line authentication only, as the
sender needs to know all packets in the stream to calculate
the desired sequence of hashes
A breakthrough in design of the hash chain based authen-
tication schemes for streamed data has been the technique
proposed by Golle and Modadugu in [10]. It follows from
the fact that if a collision-resistant hash of packet P
1
is
appended to several modifications to the scheme were pro-
posed in literature, and well generalized by packet P
2
be-
fore signing P
2
, then the signature on P
2
guarantees the
authenticity of both P
2
and P
1
. In general, a hash h
1
of
P
1
is appended to P
2
before calculating a hash h
2
for P
2
,
and h
2
is appended to P
3
before calculating h
3
for P
3
, and
so on. The final packet in a sequence, P
n
is then signed
after appending h
n 1
to it. If then the sequence of packets
P
1
; : : : ; P
n
is received without tampering or losses, all
packets in that sequence can be authenticated. The process
of creating such a simple authenticating graph is presented
in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Basic one-way hash chain of Golle and Modadugu.
Fig. 6. Explanation of the proposed modification method: (a) the
original authentication chain of order 3 [10]; (b) continuation of
the chain beyond the signed packet P
n
.
The simple chain presented in Fig. 5 can be modified to
include supplementary connections to prevent it from be-
ing broken in a case of packet losses. Depending on the
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type of construction of those additional connections, im-
munity from burst losses can be achieved. As an example,
in Fig. 6a, the chain immune to a loss of two consecutive
packets is presented. Several different constructions are
presented in [10] and analyzed.
The main advantage of the scheme is the fact that by split-
ting the stream into smaller sequences of packets and re-
versing the order of the authentication chain, Golle and
Modadugu achieved a scheme suited for on-line applica-
tions where a break in the verification chain means rejec-
tion of usually just one sequence of packets (maximum two
sequences if the break includes a signed packet). Other ad-
vantages of the technique are immunity to bursts of up to
a given length, low communication overhead, and low com-
putational overhead [10]. The drawbacks of the scheme are
the delayed verification and susceptibility to a loss of signed
packets.
3. Model of a bursty channel
In his fundamental paper [15], Gilbert introduced a two
state Markov chain to model a transmission channel with
burst errors. The model has been later refined by Elliott
in [16], and is generally known in telecommunications lit-
erature as the Gilbert-Elliott channel. The Gilbert-Elliott
model has been introduced to analyze channel at bit level.
However, we can use the same approach to perform analysis
at the packet level.
Gilbert in [15] has shown that a Markov chain with two
states can be used to generate bursts. The model is shown
in Fig. 7, where the states G and B denote the “good”
channel state and the “bad” channel state, respectively. In
the “good” state the probability of packet loss approaches
zero, while in the “bad” state it can take any arbitrary value
greater than zero. In the original model [15], that proba-
bility was set to 0.5, as the author dealt with bursts at the
bit level, i.e. in the physical channel, where bursts contain
good bits interspersed with the errors. In this paper, to
simplify considerations, we will assume that at the packet
level it is very high, approaching 1. However, more general
approach can be taken at the later stage.
Fig. 7. Gilbert-Elliot channel model.
The model is described by the probability transition ma-
trix P
T
given by:
P
T
=

1  q q
p 1  p

(1)
and the corresponding graph is presented in Fig. 7.
For this Markov chain, the stationary probability vector
P
S
= [p
1
; p
2
] can be calculated using the formula:
P
S
= P
S
P
T
(2)
and the normalization condition:
p
1
+ p
2
= 1 : (3)
From Eqs. (1) and (2), we get a set of two simultaneous
equations:

p
1
= p
1
(1  q) + p
2
p
p
1
+ p
2
= 1
(4)
that give us:
p
1
=
p
1 + p  1 + q
=
p
p+ q
(5)
and:
p
2
=
q
p+ q
: (6)
The stationary probabilities p
1
and p
2
are the probabilities
that at any discrete time instant the channel is in the “good”
state or the “bad” state, respectively. For the transmitted
packets, it translates on the probabilities that the packet
is either received correctly or lost. In addition, the exact
values of the probabilities p
12
and p
21
fully determine the
probabilities of bursts occurrences and their lengths.
Let now denote by P
g
fMg the probability that out of M
signed packets in the stream all packets have been transmit-
ted in “good” state, and that subsequently no such a packet
has been lost. Following the above analysis of the Gilbert-
Elliott model, we can write that:
P
g
fMg = p
M
1
: (7)
Hence, the probability P
b
f1g that at least one signed packet
is transmitted in the “bad” state and subsequently lost is
given by:
P
b
f1g = 1  P
g
fMg = 1  p
M
1
: (8)
To illustrate the problem of the authentication method pro-
posed in [10], let us consider the following example.
Example 1. We consider here the chain construction pro-
posed in [10] that provides immunity against bursts of
length l = 5 and the stream consists of 50 sequences of
50 packets each. The packets are transmitted through the
Gilbert-Elliott channel having the following parameters1:
Probability of a transition from G to B: q = 0:01
Probability of a transition from B to G: p = 0:3
1Even though the exact channel parameters q and p are difficult to
find for virtual transport channels, i.e. where packet loss is considered,
the values used in the example correspond to one of the best channels
reported on in [17].
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The stationary probabilities p
1
and p
2
can be calculated
using Eqs. (5) and (6), and are equal to:
p
1
=
0:3
0:3+0:01
= 0:9677 and p
2
=
0:01
0:3+0:01
= 0:0323
and the probability that at least one signature is lost equals
to:
P
b
f1g = 1  0:9677
50
= 0:8059 :
The presented example indicates that even for quite a mod-
est stream (50 sequences of 50 packets of 1000 bytes corre-
spond to about 2.5 MB), the probability of loosing at least
one signed packet is very high, and with the increased num-
ber of sequences it approaches 1.
4. Modification method
Here we propose a simple method to overcome the prob-
lem of losing a signed packet without introducing any ad-
ditional overheads or delays in packet verification, when no
signature is lost. An extra delay in verification time will
be only introduced in the case of a burst containing the
signed packet. However, in the original scheme described
in [10], this situation would result in the whole considered
sequence of packets being rejected.
The proposed method is based on extending the authenti-
cation chain of [10] beyond the packet containing the sig-
nature, i.e. the packet, on which the authentication graph
should end for the given sequence. In other words, we
propose to consider the signed packet in a similar way to
any other packet, with the exception that no hash is gen-
erated for it. Suppose a stream is divided into sequences
S
1
; S
2
; : : : ; where each S
k
consists of n packets. Let
S
k
= fP
(k 1)n+1
; P
(k 1)n+2
; : : : ; P
kn
g : (9)
For each sequence Golle and Modadugu [10] proposed an
optimal authentication chain to provide resistance for bursty
loss of packets with the assumption that the signed packet
P
kn
is not lost. We modify their authentication chain by
introducing extra edges between S
k
and S
k+1
and removing
the assumption of no signed packet lost.
Our authentication chain is defined as follows. Let a be
a positive integer. The hash of a packet P
i
is appended to
two packets P
i+1
and P
i+a
for all i; (k   1)n < i < kn,
and for all k  1. This authentication chain sustains bursts
of a  1, packets, even including the packet with signature.
If the signature packet is lost, the authentication has a delay
of 2n.
An example application of the proposed solution together
with the authentication chain of [10] is given in Fig. 6.
The diagram of Fig. 6a shows the original authentication
chain, while the diagram of Fig.6b presents what happens
around the signed packet P
n
. As the authors of [10] point
out, their authentication chain (Fig. 6a) is immune to bursts
of 2 packets, but the signed packet P
n
must be delivered
correctly. In our case, if the burst of 2 packets contains
the signed packet, e.g. packets P
n 1
and P
n
are lost, the
authentication chain is not broken, and verification can be
performed after receiving the next signed packet, i.e. P
2n
.
Moreover, if the bursts are no longer than the length for
which the original chain has been designed, any received
signature can be used to verify all previously received pack-
ets, no matter how many signed packets have been lost.
There are no any additional computational overheads in-
volved, and there is almost no (the hashes from the previous
sequence packets are now attached to the current sequence
packets, as in Fig. 6b) additional communication overhead
involved in the proposed scheme compared to the original
scheme described in [10]. All chain constructions proposed
in [10] can be used together with the proposed method.
This does not seem to be the case of constructions pro-
posed in [14], as the signatures are there transmitted with
the first packet in sequences. However, this requires some
further investigations.
Let us now analyze the probability that the authentication
chain constructed in accordance with our modification will
be broken. This can only happen when the burst contain-
ing more than b packets occur, while the construction is
immune to bursts of no more than b packets.
The burst of length l = b occurs when channels changes
state from G to B, stays there for b consecutive steps and
returns to G afterwards. Because the verification chain is
resistant to burst of length l = b, the break of the verifi-
cation chain occurs at the state s(n) = B if, s(n 1) = B,
s
(n 2)
= B; : : : ; s
(n b)
= B, and s(n b 1) = G. Hence,
we can model the verification chain breaking process by a
sequential stochastic machine of b + 2 states. We denote
the states of this machine by 
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
b+2
.
The state 
1
occurs when the channel is in the “good” state
and the state 
b+2
when the verification chain is broken.
The states 
2
; 
3
; : : : ; 
b+1
are the states corresponding
to the bursts of length 1; 2; : : : ; b, respectively. Using the
original Gilbert-Elliot model, we can find the respective
transition probabilities. They are given by the transition
probability matrix:
P

=
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
1 q q 0 0 0    0
p 0 1 p 0 0    0
p 0 0 1 p 0    0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
p 0 0 0 0    1 p
p 0 0 0 0    1 p
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
: (10)
The corresponding graph is given in Fig. 8.
As the resulting (b+2) – state Markov chain is a stationary
one, (the matrix P

does not depend on the number of
a currently transmitted packet) we can find the vector of
stationary probabilities P

by solving the set of (b + 2)
linear equations:
8
<
:
P

= P

P

b+2
P
i=1
p
i
= 1
: (11)
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The probability p
(b+2)
is the stationary probability that
during the transmission of a packet, the verification chain
is broken.
Fig. 8. Graph of the Markov chain given by matrix (9).
Having found the probability p
(b+2)
, we can calculate
the probability P
K
fbreakg that during the transmission
of K packets the verification chain is broken at least once.
Those K packets are assumed as transmitted in the steady
state, i.e. they do not include first b packets in the stream.
It is given by:
P
K
fbreakg = 1  (1  p
(b+2)
)
K
: (12)
This will be illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Let us consider here the same stream trans-
mitted as in Example 1 through the same channel. We will
find the probabilities that the verification chain will be bro-
ken during the transmission of a single sequence and the
whole stream of 50 sequences. We compare the results for
the cases when the authentication chain is created to be
immune against bursts of lengths 3, 5, and 8.
To find answers to the problem, we first need to construct
the relevant transition probability matrices and find the sta-
tionary probabilities of the states corresponding to the break
in the verification process. While for b = 3, this is still
a feasible task to find the stationary probabilities manually,
as
P

=
2
6
6
6
6
4
1  q q 0 0 0
p 0 1  p 0 0
p 0 0 1  p 0
p 0 0 0 1  p
p 0 0 0 1  p
3
7
7
7
7
5
=
=
2
6
6
6
6
4
0:99 0:01 0 0 0
0:30 0 0:70 0 0
0:30 0 0 0:70 0
0:30 0 0 0 0:70
0:30 0 0 0 0:70
3
7
7
7
7
5
: (13)
However, it becomes more cumbersome for the cases when
b = 5 or b = 8. Any standard software package can be
used to provide solution to the set of linear equations. We
used here MATLAB, and the results are given in Table 1.
After that, we can use formula (12) to find the probabilities
of breaking the verification stream for a single sequence of
50 packets, and for the whole stream of 50 sequences. The
results are given in Table 2.
Table 1
Stationary probabilities of breaking the verification chain
for the case considered in Example 2
Verification chain immune Stationary probability
against bursts of length b of a break in the verification chain
3 0.0111
5 0.0054
8 0.0019
Table 2
Probabilities of the verification chain being broken during
the transmission of a single sequence of 50 packets
and the whole stream of 50 sequences for the Example 2
Verification chain Probability Probability
immune against of breaking of breaking
bursts of length b verification chain verification chain
in a single sequence in a whole stream
3 0.4277 1.0000
5 0.2372 1.0000
8 0.0907 0.9913
The results from Example 2 indicate that the stationary
probabilities of breaking the verification chain are quite
low, as shown in Table 1, and decrease with an increase
in the maximum length of burst to which the verification
chain is immune to. However, the probabilities of having
at least one break in the verification chain for the transmis-
sion of whole stream are very high, approaching 1 in all
considered cases. This is due to the fact that the considered
channel is characterized with the high value of a transition
from the “good” to the “bad” state and equal to 0.01. This
value is more likely to be experienced in wireless channels.
However, with the proliferation of multimedia services to
the wireless environment such channels need to be consid-
ered while designing authentication algorithms for streamed
data.
5. Conclusions
In the paper we presented a modification to the Golle and
Modadugu authentication chain [10] that results in a chain
resistant to losses of packets containing sequence signa-
tures. The modification is achieved without any additional
computational or communication overheads. In addition,
we have introduced here a Markov chain method to ana-
lyze performance of authentication schemes. It draws from
the fact that channel with burst losses can be modeled by
a two state Markov process, referred to as the Gilbert-Elliot
model. The method can be very useful in analyzing perfor-
mance of different authentication schemes under realistic
channel conditions.
51
Beata J. Wysocki, Yejing Wang, and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
In the future, we expect to perform such an analysis for
other hash chain based schemes taking into account multi-
ple bursts. This will of course result in more complicated
Markov chains of the verification process.
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